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COMMENTS

COMMENTS
CORPORATIONS-THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TEST IN RECAPITALIZATIONs--Changes in capital structures of corporations which modify
rights of security holders generally occur under one of two circumstances: 1 (I) reorganization of insolvent 2 corporations which affects
1 For a description of the circumstances, see Dodd, "Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations," 55 HARV, L. REv. 780 at 780-784 (1942).
2 Insolvent, in this respect, 1s used to include both corporations which are insolvent in the bankruptcy sense and corporations which are insolvent in the equity sense
of being unable to pay debts as they mature.
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the rights of creditors as well as shareholders and necessitates judicial
supervision; and (2) recapitalization of solvent corporations involving
only the relative rights of the different classes of shareholders. It is
the author's present purpose to focus attention on the effect of the
latter type of modification on the most zealously guarded right of the
preferred shareholder-the right to accrued dividends on cumulative
preferred stock.8

A. Voluntary Recapitalization
Basically, the reason for a voluntary recapitalization, affecting preferred shareholders' rights, is to depict a changed financial condition
on the corporate balance sheet in order to attract new investment, that
is, for the most part, common share financing, and to preserve the corporation as a going concern.4 Also, recapitalizations may be occasioned
by a desired merger or consolidation. To accomplish this change, the
articles of incorporation, a part of the stock contract, must be amended,
an act which involves two basic issues: 5 (I) Are the adjustments permissible within the terms of the preferred. stock contract? ( 2) Are
the adjustments fair and equitable? By the terms of the type of stock
contract assumed here, the preferred shareholder's preference includes
a right to accrued dividends.
The technical rules by which to test the validity of corporate modification of this contractual priority have undergone a series of gradual
3 On the problem of accrued dividends, generally, see Meck, "Accrued Dividends
on Cumulative Preferred Stock: the Legal Doctrime," 55 HARV. L. REv. 71 (1941).
See collection of cases in 32 MxcH. L. REV. 743 at 775, note II8 (1934), and 46
YALE L. J. 985 at 990 (1937), wherein it is stated, "Although courts in general
have allowed amendments changing other features of a class of stock, such as its proportionate right to dividends, its redemption price, its voting powers, and the preferences to which it is entitled, no court to which the question has been presented has
yet [1937] upheld a recapitalization plan which cancels accumulated arrears accrued
prior to the time of cancellation." And see cases collected id. at 992, note 21.
4 See "The Doctrine of Strict Priority in Corporate Recapitalization," 54 YALE
L. J. 840, especially at 840, note I (1945).
5
BERLE AND MEANS, THE MoDERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 248
(1932), "In every case, corporate action must be twice tested: first, by the technical
rules having to do with the existence and proper exercise of the power; second, by
equitable rules • • • ." The phrase is footnoted and reworded in the text by Meck,
"Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stock: The Legal Doctrine," 55 HARV,
L. REv. 71 at 73 (1941), but at p. 97 he suggests a different framing of the dual
problem, first asking if the corporation has the power, then asking- if the exercise of
the power is limited by equitable rules. See 77 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 256 at 257 (1928),
and the suggested limitation to the decision in Davis v. Louisville Gas and Electric
Co., (Del. 1928) 142 A. 654.
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changes 6 since Chief Justice Marshall 7 labelled the corporate charter
a contract. Although the tide has ebbed and flowed under the conflicting forces of reserved powers :md contractual protections, the sands of
contractual rights have been slowly, but consistently, washed away.
Where a residuum of beach remains at all, there lies this right to
accrued dividends on cumulative preferred stock.8 Where the legislatures have seemed to side with the eroding elements, the courts have
to some extent erected a sea-wall.0 But although balked at this point
in many jurisdictions, the tendencies would seem to indicate that at
least the technical limitations on corporate modification of even this
right to accrued dividends are in the process of being eliminated,10
as they have been in states such as Delaware, New York, Ohio, and
Virginia.11
Even though the technical limitations are being eliminated, still,
an attempt is made to provide technical safeguards. Legislative requirements include an affirmative vote of some majority of the holders of
the preferred class of stock whose rights are to be modified,12 or protection is afforded dissenters by giving them the option of a fair cash
value for their stock if they do not wish to participate in the corporaOne of the most succinct reviews of the development is provided by BERLE
MEANS, THE MoDERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, c. 4 (1932).
Also see Meck, "Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stock: The Legal Doctrine," 55 HARV. L. REV. 71 (1941); Curran, "Minority Stockholders and the
Amendment of Corporate Charters," 32 MICH. L. REV. 743 (1934); Dodd, "Dissenting Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters," 75 UNiv. PA. L.
REV. 585, 723 (1927); Stern, "The Limitations of the Power of a State under a
Reserved Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation," 53 UNIV. PA. L.
REV. 1, 73, 145 (1905).
7 In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518
(1819).
8
See Curran, "Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters," 32 MICH. L. REv. 743 (1934); Meck, "Accrued Dividends on Cumulative
Preferred Stock: The Legal Doctrine," 55 HARV. L. REv. 71 (1941), 55 HARV L.
REv. 780 (1942), 54 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1941), and footnote 3, supra.
9
The significance of the decision in Keller v. Wilson and Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391,
190 A. II5 (1936), may be weakened to some extent by a decision made four years
later by the same court in Havender v. Federal United Corp., (Del. 1940) 11 A.
(2d) 331; but that case involved a merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary. See the
excellently documented footnote 7, 54 YALE L. J. 840 at 842 (1945), that brings
up to date the court's attitude as to the sanctity of accrued dividends.
10
See Dodd's summary, "Accrued Dividends in Delaware Corporations---From
Vested Right to Mirage," 57 HARV. L. REv. 894 (1944).
11
Ohio Gen. Code Ann. (Page, 1937) §§ 8623-14, 8623-15; Va. Code Ann.
(Mic.hie, 1942) § 3780; N.Y. Stock Corp. Law (McKinney, 1940) § 36. See 54
YALE L. J. 840 at 842, 843 (1945).
12
See Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 2058. See 55 HARV. L. REv. 780 at 787-791
(1942).
11
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tion in its modified form. 18 However, as almost universally the method
of recapitalization is an internal matter carried out by some majority
vote by class of shareholders,14 the protection of judicial proceedings
is not afforded, as in the case of reorganizations.15 Since there is no
statutory provision for judicial review, a dissenter's remedy 16 is only
the limited one of an equitable. bill seeking relief against an amendment claimed to be invalid as to the dissenter; but the review would
seem to be limited to such questions as whether the statute is constitutional,11 whether the amendment is authorized by the statute,18 and
whether the amendment has been adopted in the proper manner and
by the proper vote. 19 To invalidate the proposed plan of modification
on the ground of unfairness, the Delaware Chancery stated in a recent
case 20 that the ". . . unfairness must be of such character and ,must be
so clearly demonstrated as to impel the conclusion that it emanates
from acts of. bad faith, or a reckless indi:fference to the rights of others
interested, rath~r than from an honest error in judgment." 21
The statutory standard, requiring reorganization programs to be
fair and equitable,22 although attended by some ambiguity in its applicatjon, especially where an effort is made to achieve plans which are
"feasible" as well as "fair and equitable," has been made definite by
'
See N.Y. Stock Corp. La:w '(McKinney, 1940) § 38(9).
14
Many of the statutes provide that amendments shall be adopted by resolution
of the board of directors before they are submitted to the shareholders. See e.g. Del.
Rev. Code (1935) § 2058.
15 The method adopted for reorganizations is a petition to a federal court, fol\lowed by the appointment of an independent trustee and in many cases by the active
intervention of an administrative agency. The series of decisions: Northern Pacific
Ry; v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482, 33 S.Ct. 1913 (1913) (see "The Doctrine of Strict
Priority," 54 YALE L. J. 840 (1945); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,
308 U.S. 106,. 60 S.Ct. 1 (1939) [see Dodd, "The Los Angeles Lumber Products
Co. Case and Its Implications," 53 HARv'. L. REv. 713 (1940)]; and Consolidated
Rock Prodpcts Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 61 S.Ct. 675 (1941)~ has made it
mandatory, in theory, that reorganization plans be subjected to' a definite test, which
permits only a limited amount of flexibility.
'
16
See Lattin, "Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders," 45 HARV. L. REV. 233
(1931); 75 UNiv. PA. L. REV. 585, 723 especially at 750-752 (1927); 27 CoL.
L. REv. 547 (1927); 32 CoL. L. REV. 60 (1932).
,
17 Keller v. Wilson and Co., 21 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. II5 (1936)'.
18 Consolidated Film Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 21 Del. Ch. 417, 197 A. 489
(1937).
19 Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., (Del.
Ch. 1941) 21 A. (2d) 178, aff'd (Del. 1942) 24 A. (2d) 315.
20 Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., (Del. Ch. 1943) 32 A. (2d) 148. See 57
HARV. L. REV. 894 at 896 (1944).
21
32 A. (2d) 148 at 151 (1943).
22
Bankruptcy Act, c. X, §§ 156, 169; 52 Stat. L. 888, ,890 (1938), I I u.s.c.
(Supp. 1939) §§ 556, 569.
18
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the courts, for no plan is fair and equitable unless senior claims in
the hierarchy of corporate securities are -fully compensated before
junior claims participate in the reorganization. 28 This doctrine of strict
priority in reorgani~tions was established in the Boyd case of r913,2 '
adopted as the legislative yardstick in the Bankruptcy Act, 25 and the
concept rounded out by the decision in Consolidated Rock Products Co.
v. Du Bois in 1941.26 The lack of statutory standards and the limited
judicial review afforded by an equitable bill in the case of recapitalization, coupled with the disadvantageous position of the typical preferred
shareholder,27 makes obvious the need for some method to assure
the fairness of _recapitalizations. A tendency toward the adoption of
the same test of strict priority for voluntary recapitalizations,28 as
.applied· in reorganizations, is indicated by the statement in the Consolidated Rock Co. case that the rule of the Boyd case applies to reorganizations of solvent, as well as insolvent, companies. And in reorganizations the strict priority rule is applied between different classes of shareholders in addition to the creditor-stockholder relationship. 29 The
problem seems to be more or less procedural, for the technical safeguards of majority vote and optional redemption dissuade the courts
from declaring recapitalization plans unfair and inequitable; but the
decisions in the Durham Hosiery Mills case so aµd the Buckley case 31
indicate an appreciation of the problem by some courts.
·

B. Compulsory Recapitalization Under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act
The inequities attending voluntary recapitalizations were clearly
recognized by both the courts 82 and the writers; 33 but the solution of
28

See F1NLETrER, THE LAw OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION, 427-477,
passim (1939); 54 YALE L. J. 840 at 841, note 4 (1945); 55 Hf\RV. L. REV. 780
at 786, note 19 (1942).
24
See note I 5, supra.
25
See note 22, supra.
26 See nQte I 5, supra.
27
See 55 HARV. L. REv. 780 .at 790 (1942); 54 HARV. L. REv. 488 (1941).
28
See 54 HARV. L. REv. 488 at 493-495 (1941).
29
ln re Utilities Power and Light Corp., (D.C. Ill. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 763;
54 HARV. L. REV. 488 at 493, (1941). Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,
308 U.S. 106' at II9, note 14, 60 S.Ct. 258 (1939); 33 GEo. L. J. 346 (1945).
so Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N.C. 806, 200 S.E. 906 (1939).
31
Buckley v. Cuban American Sugar Co., 129 N.J. Eq. 322, 19 A. (2d) 820
(1940).
,
.
82
Willcox v. Trenton Potteries Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 173, 53 A. 474 (1902); Outwater v. Public Service Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143 A. 729 (1928); see Meck,
"Accrued Dividends on Cumulative Preferred Stock: The Legal Doctrine," 55 HARV.
L. REV. 71 at 95 et seq. (1941).
88
See 44 YALE L. J. 1025 (1935); 36 CoL. L. REv. 674 (1936).
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giving equity an affiri;native con,trol over all such ac;:ljustments was not
feasible, for it would have imposed too great an-administrative burden
on judges who were not expected to be qualified as financial experts.84
In 1935 the Securities and Exchange Commission was given the administration of the Public Utility Holding Company Act,85 section I I (b)
( 2 ), which makes it the duty of the commission to require all registered holding companies and their subsidiaries to ". . . take such steps
as the commission shall find necessary .. -~' to simplify the capital structures of their holding company systems and to correct inequities in the
distribution of voting power among security holders. Orders under
section I I (b) are reviewable in a circuit court of appeals; and, to compel compliance with such orders, the commission is authorized by section I I ( d) to resort to the district courts of the United States for
enforcement thereof. Section I I ( e) provides for voluntary compliance
by a company whereby a plan is submitted to the commission to consider whether the plan is•" ... necessary to effectuate the provisions of
[section II] subsection (b) and fair and equitable to the persons affected by such plan. . . ." At the request of the company the commission may apply to a district court for enforcement, such court being
authorized to ". . . approve such plan as fair and equitable and as
appropriate to effectuate the provisions of Section I.I ••• " and is vested
with jurisdiction to enforce the plan so approved. In order to be approved, a plan of recapitalization must meet the test of being "fair
and equitable" applied by the commission, by the district court wherein
enforcement is sought, or by the circuit court of appeals upon the
hearing of an appeal, either directly from the commission, or from
an enforcement order of a district court.86
In the exercise of its discretionary power to determine what corporate structures must be simplified, the commission has regarded the
presence of large dividend arrearages on preferred shares as sufficient
proof of undue complexity.87 What has been the result of the application of the fair and equitable test to plans involving modifications of
the right to accrued dividends?
The "fair and equitable" phrase, which had been previously used
in that part of the Bankruptcy Act 88 governing railroad reorganization
plans, was presumably an adoption of the standard that had come to be
See 46 YALE L. J. 985 at 1003 (1937).
49 Stat. L. 820 (1935), 15 U.S. C. (1940) § 79.
86 See generally 55 HARV. L. REv. 780 at 812 et seq. (1942); 57 HARV, L.
REv. 295 (1944); 93 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 308 (1945).
87 See 58 HARV. L. REv. 604 at 607 (1945).
88 Bankruptcy Act, c. X, § 216(12) (a), 52 Stat. L. 896 (1938), l l U.S.C.
··(Supp. 1939) § 616(12) (a). Chap. X superseded section 77B, but retained the
,words "fair and equitable."
84
85
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interpreted as spelling out the strict priority rule. 89 In the Federal
Water Service case of 1941,40 Commissioner Healy stated: "The words
'fair and equitable' are 'words of art' and embody a 'fixed principle'
which has had a well understood meaning for some time. It is the
'rigorous standard' of the Boyd case, as the Supreme Court has called
it." 41 But the strict priority doctrine arose out of reorganization plans
of insolvent corporations wherein the priorities have matured independently of any action taken pursuant to the statutory provisions for
reorganization. To liquidate the enterprise would wipe out a large
part of its value, therefore, the law permits reorganization as a substitute, and although reorganization prevents creditors from getting the
cash for which they bargained, at least the strict priority doctrine gives
them the nearest practicable equivalent.42 But in the case of a recapitalization under the Holding Company Act, the preferred shareholder
would not have had any matured claim but for the act; should recapitalization then be treated as the legal equivalent of liquidation? The
commission and the majority of the United States Supreme Court assert
that recapitalization is not "liquidation" within the meaning of the
preferred stock contract,43 thus liquidation preferences are but one factor in an over-all valuation. More important are the immediately
operative rights ( such as dividend rights, rather than inchoate rights of
liquidation preferences) 44 whose charter preference, by the Otis case,45
See 54 YALE L. J. 840 at 847-852 (1945).
In the Matter of Federal Water Service Corp., 8 S.E.C. 893, 924 (1941).
n See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 at 120, 60
S.Ct. I (1939).
42
See 58 HARV. L. REv. 604 at 608 (1945).
43
"The exercise of legislative power by Congress through § I 1 (b) ( 2) to accomplish simplification as a matter of public policy and the Commission's administration of the Act by dissolution of this particular company [Maryland's United Light
and Power] results in a type of liquidation which is entirely distinct from the 'liquidation of the corporation whether voluntary or involuntary,' envisaged by the charter
provisions of Power for preferences to the senior stock." Otis & Co. v. S.E.C., 323
U.S. 624 at 631, 65 S. Ct. 483 (1945), citing S.E.C. Holding Company Release
No. 4215, April 6, 1943, pp. 8-9; In the Matter of Puget Sound Power & Light Co.,
S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 4255, April 28, 1943, p. 22.
44 In the Matter of Southern Colorado Power Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act
Release No. 4501, August 24, 1943, p. 16; In the Matter of Virginia Public Service
Co., S.E.C. Holding Company Act Release No. 4618, Oct. 16, 1943, at p. 27 states
that" .•. the interests of the common stock must be measured by an evaluation of senior
claims as a whole, giving proper emphasis to those claims that are immediately operative (such as the claims to interest and preferred dividends), arid giving less significance
to those claims {such as the liquidation preference of the preferred stock) which are
inchoate rights."
45 Otis & Co. v. S.E.C., 323 U.S. 624, 65 S.Ct. 483 (1945); See 13 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 372 (1945).
so
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was held to be inapplicable to liquidation as a result of the exercise of
legislative power to accomplish simplification of the corporate structure
of a continuing business. ·
Thus, with the virtual abandonment of the strict priority rule in
the case of recapitalizations under the Holding Company Act, what
is the basis of the fair and equitable test? The problem has devolved
to one of anticipated earnings.46 If anticipated earnings exceed the dividend requirements of preferred shares as they exist under the corporate
structure prior to recapitalization,_ an amount will be left over at the
end of each fiscal year to be applied to the payment of dividend arrearages. Assuming earnings will continue as anticipated, arrearages will
•be paid off at the end of a certain number of years. Thereafter the
excess of earnings over preferred dividend requirements will be available to holders of common shares. No matter how remote the time
w~en common would receive earnings, if it were not for the intervention of recapitalization under the Holding Company Act, the eventual
possibility is said to constitute an interest vested in common which must
be recognized by granting common participation in the recapitalization.47 The real problem centers around the question as to the amount
of participation to be allowed the common; therein lies the difficulty
of measurement. 48 Now that Commissioner Healy's dissents from the
basic premise of the majority of the commission have been silenced·
by the decision in the Otis case,49 there still remain three vulnerable
points in the commission's reasoning process: 50 ( r) the estimate of
See In the Matter of Community Power and Light ·co., 6 S.E.C. 182, 193
(1939); 54 YALE L. J. 840 at 848 (1945).
47 See KEHL, CoRPORATE DrvIDENDS 217-218 (1941).
48 In the Matter of American Utilities Service Corp., S.E.C. Holding Company
Act Release No. 5II4, June 22, 1944, the release illustrates the difficulty in measuring
common's participation where corporate earning power was analyzed from the following viewpoints: (1) amount of reason~bly forseeable earnings, (2) amount -of such
which may be prudently distributed, (3) increase resulting from the reinvestment in
the business of such portion of these earnings as are not distributed, (4) the length _of
time probably required to pay o.ff accrued arrearages, (5) the making of due compensation to the preferred stockholders for giving up their preferential position, ( 6) the
possible reduction in fixed charges, (7) amounts potentially realizable if the company
is liquidated.
49
Cited supra, note 45. In the Otis case, 323 U.S. 624 at 633, 65 S.Ct. 483
(1945), the Supreme Court, through Justice Reed, said: "We reach the conclusion
that the Securities and Exchange Commission applied the correct. rule of law as to the
rights of the stockholders inter sese. That is to say, when the Commission proceeds in
the simplification of a holding company system, the rights of stockholders of a solvent
company which is ordered by the Commission to distribute its assets among its stockholders may be evaluated on the basis of a going business and not as though a liquidation were taking place."
·
50
See 93 UN1v. PA. L. REv. 308 at 318 '(1945).
46
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future earnings; (2) the assumption that all future net earnings will
be applied to the payment of current preferred dividends and the
elimination of arrearages; and (3) the lack of a predictable relation
between the number of years which the common will have to wait to
receive dividends and the percentage rate of participation in assets
in which the common shareholders will be entitled.
In the recent Phillips case,51 upon review of the commission's approval of a recapitalization plan initiated under section II ( e), Judge
Clark, in an opinion concurred in by Judges Learned and Augustus
Hand, affirmed an order of the commission. The case represented the
reversal of the usual situation, for here. the petitiqner was a common
shareholder, claiming that the recapitalization plan grossly overpaid
the preferred shareholders. In answer to the petitioner's complaint as
to the basis of earnings, the commission stated that it had never considered corporate earnings of a top holding company as an exclusive
test of fairness, for its interest lies in the actual earnings of the underlying companies, undistributed as well as distributed. The average net
income of the top holding company, the United Corporation, was
found to be $2.9r per share, while the actual earnings of its underlying
companies, undistributed as well as distributed, amounted to $4. 73 per
preference share. Thus, taking both of these into consideration, the
exchange for a package, the earnings of which average $3.56 per share,
was not an unfair one.
Again liquidation rights of shareholders alone should not be held
controlling, but in this case they were obviously deserving of careful
consideration upon the issue of the fair limits of an offer to retire pre.:
ferred stock. In regard to the strict priority rule, the court said: "It
should be noted that the issue which divided the Supreme Court in
the Otis case and has since interested the commentators is whether the
Commission had not violated the rule of absolute priority at the
expense of the preferred shareholders. And it would be anomalous
if here the commission should be held in error in allowing the corporation to offer its preferred investors somewhat nearer their full
contract rights than is the current market value." Although the preferred shareholders are not afforded the complete protection of the
contract preference (here there was a liquidation preference of $50.00
and a dividend arrearage of $5.2 5 per share) as they would be by
the application of the strict priority rule, it seems that the court does
appreciate the position of the disadvantageously situated preferred
shareholder/ 2 in this case increasing the cash payment involved in the
exchange to $6.oo from the $5.00 proposed in the company's plan.
Gi
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Phillips v. S.E.C., (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 153 F. (2d) 27.
See 54 YALE L. J. 852 (1945); 55 HARV, L. REv. 780 (1942).
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;

The series of decisions involving recapitalizations under the Holding Company Act have shown the liberal attitude of the courts as to
modification of even the previously considered vested rights of the
preferred shareholder, with only the qualification of fairness. But what
would be the solution to a situation where such modification is
ordered or approved under the act as meeting the test of being fair and
equitable, but does not pass the technical limitations of a certain majority vote? How would the stalemate be overcome where the modification is ordered under the act, yet compliance is made impossible by statutory or judicial limitations ,regarding the immunity of
such rights of the preferred shareholder? And lastly, if such modification can be ordered under the act, why cannot a corporation conduct
such modification in its corporate structure apart from the act, subject
only to the same qualification of being fair and equitable?
Robert 0. Hancox

